Fully cooperative multiagent systems-those in which agents share a joint utility model-is of special interest in AI. A key problem is that of en suring that the actions of individual agents are co ordinated, especially in settings where the agents are autonomous decision makers. We investigate approaches to learning coordinated strategies in stochastic domains where an agent's actions are not directly observable by others. Much recent work in game theory has adopted a Bayesian learning perspective to the more general problem of equilibrium selection, but tends to assume that actions can be observed. We discuss the special problems that arise when actions are not observ able, including effects on rates of convergence, and the effect of action failure probabilities and asymmetries. We also use likelihood estimates as a means of generalizing fictitious play learn ing models in our setting. Finally, we propose the use of maximum likelihood as a means of remov ing strategies from consideration, with the aim of convergence to a conventional equilibrium, at which point learning and deliberation can cease.
Introduction
The design of systems of multiple autonomous agents that interact in various ways (pursuing their own ends or com patible goals) has attracted a great deal of attention in AI. Of special interest are systems in which individual agents share the same goals or utility function-in such fully cooperative settings, the agents collectively act toward common desired ends. While more general problems involving the interac tion of potentially self-interested agents have received the bulk of attention in distributed AI, fully cooperative prob lems naturally arise in task distribution. For example, a user might assign some number of autonomous mobile robots, or perhaps software agents, to some task, all of which should share the same utility function (namely, that of the user).
For certain purposes, it may make sense to model a busi ness or organization in a similar way.
A key difficulty in cooperative multiagent systems is that of ensuring that the actions of individual agents are coor dinated so that the shared goals are achieved efficiently. This is especially important in settings where the agents are autonomous decision makers (and preprogrammed co ordinated strategies are not available), as in the situations mentioned above. One natural way to view the coordina tion problem is as a n-person cooperative game. From the perspective of game theory, we are interested in n-person games in which the players have a shared or joint utility function; that is, any outcome of the game has equal value for all players.
In this paper, we study aspects of the coordination problem from the perspective of n-player repeated games. A set of agents find themselves in a situation which requires coor dinated action (viewed as a single-stage decision problem), but can encounter this situation repeatedly.1 Methods such as allowing agents to communicate their intentions before hand or imposing specific behaviors (e.g., by means of a central controller or the use of social laws) may ensure that agents behave in a coordinated fashion. However, our in terest in this paper is in methods that enable agents to learn their component of a coordinated policy through repeated experience with the game situation.
Learning techniques have been well-studied in game theory, not only for coordination in cooperative games, but also for the more general problem of equilibrium selection [12, 5] . Models applied to this problem include fictitious play [13] and Bayesian best-response methods [8, 19, 4] (evolution ary models have also attracted a great deal of attention [1, 11] ). These have especially nice behavior in coordination problems [19] . However, these models tend to assume that each agent can observe the exact action performed by all others at each interaction. Such action observable scenar-ios will likely be rare in practice, especially when individual actions have stochastic effects. Even if states of the system (and thus action outcomes) are fully observable-as they might be in a Markov decision model-it is unlikely that agents will have access to the actual action another agent attempted (and hence the "intentions" of the other agent).
We focus our attention on games where actions are stochas tic, and actions are not directly observable. In general, agents can observe only the state resulting from the actions of the group of players; but they can use this observation to assess the probability that other agents performed partic ular actions. The introduction of this type of uncertainty and partial observability is rather simple to model, but it has some rather surprising effects on convergence to coordi nated action in the Bayesian best-response model, which we examine here. We also adapt fictitious play to this unobserv able action setting through the use of likelihood estimates, and show that convergence is generally much better than in the Bayesian model.
Finally, we consider the problem of learning conventions [9, 16] . One difficulty with stochastic games and models that require constant learning is that a run of "bad luck" can force agents out of a coordinated equilibrium. More seri ous are the computational implications of constantly updat ing beliefs and computing a best response for every inter action. Following Lewis [9] , we take an interest in conven tional behavior. Agents should converge to a common un derstanding and, once realizing that they have reached a co ordinated equilibrium, should never be forced to reconsider how to act. Of course, care must be taken to ensure this understanding is based on common knowledge, or globally accessible information. To this end, we propose the use of " _ globally accessible" likelihood estimates to rule out par ticular ways of acting, until only a conventional method of acting remains whenever possible.
We describe the basic framework of coordination games in Section 2, as well as their application to multiagent sequen tial decision processes (in the form of multiagent Markov decision processes). In Section 3 we detail classic mod els from game theory for learning coordinated actions, in particular fictitious play and Bayesian methods. We also point out the difficulty asymmetric coordination games pose for such methods. In Section 4, we extend these models in rather obvious ways to deal with stochastic, partially observable actions. We study a number of properties of these models and how convergence is affected by them. We address t�e proble �. of convention in Section 5, proposing an extensiOn of fictitiOus play dynamics whereby likelihood estimates for optimal joint actions are used to rule out pos sible courses of action.
Experimental results are provided to illustrate the perfor mance of these methods. We focus (primarily, not exclu sively) on 2 x 2 games to keep the exposition clear; but most of the conclusions we draw can be applied more broadly. I�tuitively, each agent receives reward U (s) if the joint ac tiOn adopted by the agents results in s; the game is thus fully cooperative, for agents cannot do better by making things worse for others . 2 We note that state games are essentially single-stage exten sive form games; but it is convenient to sometimes convert them to the corresponding strategic form (or their normal representation) [12] . Each joint action a can be associated with its expected utility, Lo�;s Pra(s) · U(s), and states can be done away with, resultmg in a strategic form game.
Learnin g Conventions
However, the existence of distinct outcome states is crucial in the learning models we adopt below. In particular, the states provide indirect information about action choices in cases where actions are not directly observable. Conversion to strategic form precludes the use of this partial informa ti � n; however, when actions are perfectly observable, we w11I often use strategic form.
As an example, consider the 2 x 2 game illustrated in Fig   �re 1 could not do better using any other strategy 1r;.
Finally, we say that the strategy profile II is a Nash equi librium iff 1r; E II is a best response to IL1, for every agent i. In other words, the agents are in equilibrium if no agent could expect a better outcome by unilaterally de viating from its strategy. In general, the interests of dif ferent agents can conflict, making equilibrium determina tion quite difficult. However, in fully cooperative games each agent expects the same reward and can easily deter mine an interesting set of equilibrium profiles as follows. We first convert the state game to strategic form (by taking expectation of outcome utilities). Any joint action whose expected value is maximal is a (deterministic)Nash equilib rium. Such an equilibrium is called an optimal joint action (OJA). If the agents coordinate their choices so that they se lect an OJA, they are behaving as well as possible.
To illustrate with our example problem (in either the deter ministic or nondeterministic version), we see that the OJ As are (l, l} and (r, r} . These strategy profiles offer maximal expected utility for both agents. We note however that be ing in equilibrium does not guarantee the agents are behav ing optimally (in a joint sense). The profile in which each agent adopts a randomized strategy that selects l and r with equal probability is also an equilibrium: given that agent A choosesl orr, each with probability 0.5, B has no incentive to change its strategy (similarly for A). But this randomized equilibrium is suboptimal, for its expected value is half that of the optimal equilibria.
Nash equilibria, unfortunately, do not solve the coordina tion problem. While the agents can determine the OJAs quite readily, the problem remains: how do they decide which OJA to adopt? In its most general form, this is pre cisely the problem of equilibrium selection studied in game theory [12, 5] . We take the coordination problem to be that of ensuring agents select individual actions that together constitute an optimal or coordinated equilibrium, or OJA.3 We focus here on learning models in which agents repeat edly interact with the same set of players in state games.
Multiagent MDPs
In this section, we assume that each agent can observe the actions of the others at each interaction. Intuitively, each agent uses its past history to form an estimate of strategies used by the other agents. At each interaction, or play of the game, an agent will choose a best response action to exe cute, given its predictions (or beliefs) about the behavior of the other agents. Once the game is played, the agent can observe the actual actions chosen by the other players and update its beliefs regarding future play accordingly.
Fictitious Play
One of the simplest learning models for repeated games is fictitious play [ 13] . Each agent i keeps a count ci,,
, aJ E Aj, of the number of times agent j has used action ai in the past. When the game is encountered, i treats the relative frequencies of each of j's moves as in dicative of j's current (randomized) strategy. That is, for each agent j, i assumes j plays action ai E Aj with probability c�j I (Lbi E Aj ctj). This set of strategies forms a re duced profile IT_;, for which agent i adopts a best response.
After the play, i updates its counts appropriately, given the actions used by the other agents.
This very simple adaptive strategy is not guaranteed to con verge to equilibrium in general, but will converge for two person zero-sum games [13] . More importantly, the meth ods of Young [19] can be applied to our simple coopera tive games to show that it is guaranteed to converge to a coordinated equilibrium (that is, the probability of coordi nated equilibrium after k interactions can be made arbitrar ily high by increasing k sufficiently). We simply require that an agent randomize between all pure best responses when more than one is available.5 It is also not hard to see that once the agents reach an equilibrium, they will remain there-each best response simply reinforces the beliefs of the other agents that the coordinated equilibrium remains in force. We do not discuss rates of convergence or experi ments, since the model is similar to the particular Bayesian methods we describe next.
Bayesian Best-Response Model
A popular method for learning to selec� equilibria assumes that agents have a prior beliefs, in the form of a probabil ity distribution, over the possible strategies of other agents, use Bayesian update this adjust their priors as experience dictates, and adopt a best response at each interaction based on their current beliefs [8, 4] . In repeated games, one could (and should) technically have priors over another agent's sequential strategy, including how it might react to one's current moves in the future (8] . However, the practical dif fi culties of specifying anything but the simplest priors is ev ident; this also runs contrary to the spirit of decomposing sequential problems into states games (Section 2.2). So we restrict attention to beliefs about single-stage strategies for the state game G.
We assume each agent i has an prior distribution over the strategies that could be adopted by other agents. The be liefs of agent i about agent j are represented by a probability distribution over the set of (randomized) strategies �(Aj) agent j might adopt. We denote by Bel; (j, 1r j, s) the degree of belief agent i has that j will perform strategy 7rj.
As a general rule, any reasonable prior could be used (pro vided it does not rule out the choice of some action in the state game). However, we will consider only the case where each agent uses a simple prior, the Dirichlet distribution. This can be represented with a small number of parameters and can be updated and used quite easily. Let n be the car dinality of j's action set. Agent i's beliefs about j are rep resented by the Dirichlet parameters Nr, ... N�, capturing a density function (see [6] ) over such strategies. The expectation of kth action being adopted by j is Et , . In-
tuitively, each Nk can be viewed as the number of times outcome k (in this case action k) has been observed. The initial parameters adopted by agent i represent its prior be liefs about agent j's strategy. For simplicity, we assume that prior parameters are set uniformly (e.g., at 1), reflecting a uniform expectation for each of j's actions (this is not a uni form prior over strategies, of course).
As in fictitious play, at each interaction agent i should adopt a best response based on its current beliefs. Instead of a strategy profile, agent i has a distribution over individual strategies and an induced distribution over profiles. How ever, the Dirichlet parameters permit the expectation of in dividual moves, and hence a best response, to be determined easily. When the interaction has ended, i updates its beliefs by incrementing the parameters Ni (where agent j was ob served to perform its kth action).6
6 lt is important to note that the agents are updating as if the sampled distribution were stationary, which it is not. Thus, con vergence must be ensured by properties of best responses. We also note th at the conclusions we draw below regarding the per formance of Bayesian learning (versus fictitious play) are not in tended to denigrate the Bayesian method. The fact is we are using priors about "initial" strategies as if they were beliefs about the fi- In our example above (assuming observable actions), we might set the initial belief parameters of both agent A and B to ( 1, 1) (they each expect the other to go left or right with equal probability). Thus, they will each randomize between l and r uniformly. If the result of this randomization is coor dinated (e.g., joint action (l, l) ), both update their distribu tion to be (2, 1). At the next interaction, both will adopt las a best response and reinforce the initial choice. It is easy to see that the OJA (l, l) is guaranteed to be selected forever.
However, suppose the initial randomization results in the joint action ( l, r) . In this case, their updated beliefs will be different: A's parameters (1, 2} indicate B will again per form r, while B's (2, 1) indicate the opposite. There is no chance of coordination at the next interaction: the action will be (r, l) (each switches actions). Their updated param eters will each be (2, 2) at this point and randomization can again take place providing another chance to coordinate at the third interaction.
It is not hard to see that, in this example, the agents have the opportunity to randomize at every second interaction, and the chance of coordination at each such round is 0.5.
The probability that the agents fail to converge by round k (i.e., 1j2L �J) therefore decreases exponentially with k.
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows experimental results for this 2 x 2 games, as well as larger n x n pure coordination games.7 The x-axis shows the number of times the game has been encountered, while the y-axis shows the average error probability-the chance an uncoordinated joint action is adopted using the agents's best response strategies at that point. In such pure coordination games, it is quite easy to nal "coordinated" strategies. It is remarkable that this misuse of Bayesian methodology works at all. 7In each game there are n agents with n actions. The set of moves is the same for all agents and they are rewarded with value c if they each execute the same move, and are given a smaller value d if they do not. Hence. there are n OJ As. 
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Should the agents start with prior parameters (1, 1) repre senting their beliefs about the other's moves, then A's initial best response is l, while B's is r. The agents will not have the chance to coordinate their actions until they can ran domize among their pure best responses-when A assesses the probability of r (for B) to be � (or B assigns probability � to l). Given the integer nature of the updates, this can only happen at the sixth interaction, and every seventh inter action after that. Thus, the rate of convergence (while still exponential) is slowed linearly by a factor of seven. To il lustrate the nature of these "plateaus", see Figure 3 : values other than 4 (in the matrix above) are shown, along with the original 2 x 2 symmetric game.
Proposition 1 Let G be a 2 x 2 coordination game, with a denoting the utility of coordinated action, and b, c denot ing the utility of the two uncoordinated actions. Assuming uniformDirichletpriorparameters {1, 1), the probability of failing to reach convergence at round k is 1/ ( 2l � J ) , where g = gcd((a-c), (a-c)+ (a-d)).
Thus convergence is slowed linearly by the factor g. This can be extended to non integer utilities in the obvious way; as long as the utilities are rational, convergence is guaran teed. We also note that nonuniform priors have little effect here, and that more heavily weighted priors do not preclude convergence, but can force a certain minimum number of encounters before coordination is possible.
Learning with Unobservable Stochastic Actions
The key difficulty with the models described above is the assumption that actions can be observed. As described at the outset, agents will typically be able to observe only the outcomes of these actions, and not the actions themselves. However, since the agents all know the game structure, the observations they make still provide evidence regarding the choices made by other agents. One simply needs to account for the inherent uncertainty in this information.
It is worth noting that, in general, there must be a sufficient number of observable states that can be used to distinguish (probabilistically) which joint actions have been executed for useful learning to take place. For instance, suppose we have simple matrix game where agents move to a good state or a bad state. If they can't observe the action chosen by oth ers when moving to a bad state, then they can't tell which of the uncoordinated moves other agents did (i.e., very little information is available from which to learn). Our perspec tive is not so much that agents have a choice of actions that, correctly chosen, take them to a (single) good state (which is one interpretation of strategic form); rather they have a choice of possible good states, and their actions must be co ordinated in the sense of agreeing on the state they "aim" for. (These are, of course, extreme points on a spectrum.)
Bayesian Best-Response Adapted
The Bayesian best-response model we described above can be adapted to the case of unobservable stochastic actions in a rather straightforward way. As before, we assume agents use Dirichlet distributions over the strategies of oth ers to represent their beliefs. While belief parameters can not be updated directly with observation of a particular ac tion, agent i can update its beliefs about j's strategy by a simple application of Bayes rule. Agent i first computes the probability that j performed a for any ai E Aj, given the observed states and its previous action ai: strategies using this "stochastic observation;" in particu lar Ni is incremented by Pr( a{ it) (intuitively, by a "frac tional" outcome).9
In the stochastic version of our example, let A and B adopt the initial parameters ( 1, 1). If the initial randomization re sults in coordinated joint action (e.g. (l, l) ), and the prob able outcome s1 results, coordination is assured forever.
However, suppose the first joint action is (l, r) and it has its most likely outcome s4. Then A's belief parameters be come (1.1, 1.9) and B's (1.9, 1.1). The best response at the next interaction is (r, l), resulting in updated parame ters {1.938, 2.061) for A and (2.061, 1.938) forB (assum ing the expected outcome). Unlike the deterministic case, the agents will not be able to randomize or coordinate. In fact, given any sequence of "most likely outcomes," it is not hard to see that A and B will never coordinate, unless they do initially. Fortunately, this cycle of suboptimal joint ac tions can be broken by an unlikely outcome (i.e., if one of the actions "fails"). Experimental results for different fail ure probabilities in this 2 x 2 scenario are shown in Figure 4 .
These results illustrate the rather "paradoxical" fact that the less error prone (or more predictable) the available actions are, the slower the agents are to converge. Indeed, one can see that the stochastic actions play the role of "experimen tation" for these agents, a technique used in game theory for agents to break out of suboptimal best response cycles.10
One way to enhance convergence is to have agents random9These fractional parameters correspond to the expectations of a weighted combination of integer-parameter Dirichlet distribu tions that result from standard update using the positive probabil ity outcomes. ize over .:-best responses [8] . This allows agents to ran domize among actions that are close to being best responses given their current beliefs. In the example above, the beliefs of the agents "hover" around the point at which they will randomize-allowing .:-best responses gives the agents am ple opportunity to break out of such cycles. This results in slightly better convergence in this example (see Figure 5 ).
Fictitious Play Adapted
Finally, we note that fictitious play can be adapted to the setting of unobservable stochastic actions with good suc cess. Unlike the Bayesian model, we cannot rely on priors to estimate the probability a given action was performed.
Instead we use likelihood estimates as a means of updat ing frequency counts in a way that accounts for the stochas tic aspect of observations. When an outcome state s is ob served, each agent i determines Pr" ( s ) for each joint action a (this is just part of the agent's model). The relative likeli hood of a is Pra ( s) J Lb Prb ( s), where a and bare restricted to range over joint actions such that In our example, frequency parameters are updated by 0.9 or 0.1 for every possible outcome. This allows agents to randomize much more frequently, and is comparable to the 
Conventions
Finally, we consider how true conventions might arise via learning. The problem with all of the models above, in the presence of stochastic actions, is that they cannot be said to converge to a true convention in the sense discussed in the introduction. By a conventional way of acting, we mean a fixed strategy that is applied to a given situation without re quiring any special deliberation. The learning models de scribed all have a chance of "popping out" of equilibrium (e.g., through a series of unlikely occurrences) though the probability of this generally decreases quickly over time. A more serious difficulty is that the agents must constantly up date their beliefs and "reconsider" their choice of action (by recomputing possible best responses). This is certainly not in the spirit of conventions, or fixed rules of encounter, that one must simply apply to a given situation.
Intuitively, we would like agents to adopt some criterion that would allow them to identify that an optimal equilib rium has been reached, and that this realization is common knowledge. In this way, agents will eventually stop "think ing" about how to behave in a given state and simply act.11 It is important to emphasize the role common knowledge (l , l), that has maximum likelihood. We notice that each agent can determine this independent of any personal infor mation, and is aware that others have this ab ility as well the OJ As with maximum likelihood are common knowledge.
From this point on, the agents will perform (l, l), even if the initial action they performed was (r, r}, and by chance it had this very unlikely outcome.
In a similar 3 x 3 game, once could imagine that moving to a certain state is most likely given two of the three OJ As (e.g., (1, 1, 1) and (2, 2, 2)), but is less likely given the third (e.g., (3, 3, 3) ). When this state is observed, the agents will rej ect (3, 3, 3) as a potential equilibrium, will individually never consider performing action 3, and will never consider a joint action in which the other agents performed 3 to have positive probability at any future interaction: the rows in the matrix corresponding to the components of the rejected OJA will be effectively "deleted ." .
Formally, conventions are added to a learning model (such as fictitious play) as fol lows. At each interaction (say inter-
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action k ), each agent computes a likelihood estimate LE( a)
for each OJA a, given the observed outcome (we note that in fi ctitious play, these are computed fo r all joint actions, and will therefore be available anyway). The set MLE( k) is the set of OJ As that have maximum likelihood. The game is then altered as fol lows: any action ai E Ai that does not oc cur in any element of MLE( k) is "deleted" from the game in the sense defined above. At interaction k + 1, coordination is attempted for this reduced game. If we are fo rtunate, the MLE set will eventually be pared down to a singleton (or a set of OJ As with "interchangeable" components) and a con vention will be reached that can never be dropped. This will not always be the case, of course, as we discuss below.
Conventions based on maximum likelihood estimates can be implemented "as is", with each agent randomly choos ing actions and ruling out certain possibilities as warranted by MLE. However, this is unlikely to work well in scenarios with a sufficiently large number of outcomes, so that many states have zero probability of being reached by any OJA (e.g., imagine a 10 x 10 game where only a small fraction of the 101 actions have positive probability of an "informa tive" outcome). In this case, the rate of convergence will be dictated by the probability of reaching an informative state given a random joint action (which can be tiny in a case like this). We actually want to use learning to bias agent re sponses in order to increase the probability of an OJA (or simply the chance of informative outcomes). Convergence for fictitious play with conventions is com pared to straightforward fictitious play for our standard 2 x 2 game in Figure 6 , and a more complicated 3 x 3 game in Figure 7 . In both cases convergence is enhanced, remark ably so in the 3 x 3 case, where coordination is guaran teed after one interaction. Of course, this is an artifact of the game-each outcome state has a unique OJA with max imum likelihood.12 While convergence is enhanced, we note that a more important fu nction of conventions is their role in the eventual elimination of the computational burden associated with ongoing computation of best responses.
12Infor mally, this game has six outcome states, three "good" and three "bad". Each good state corresponds to an OJA in the sense that the OJ A likely leads to that state. If only two of the three individual actions are the same, there is a small chance of moving to the good state corresponding to the majority action, and so on. The game was actually designed to prevent ordinary fictitious play fr om converging too quickly ! We note that conventions will not general ly lead to a unique choice of OJA. For example, in a game with three OJAs, where two of them lead to the same outcomes with the same probabilities, nothing can distinguish the two from the point of view of likelihood. In other words, each action outcome accords the same likelihood to these two actions. In this case, the learning component will choose one of the two ac tions; but while conventional deliberations may rule out the third, they must leave open the possibility that either of the remaining two actions could be performed. In such a case, conventions cannot be used to prevent agents from contin uing to update their beliefs. 13 However, in a case like this conventions still play a role in restricting attention in learn ing to particular possibilities, even if they cannot choose a unique equilibrium. The analysis of conventions and their effect on convergence is the subject of ongoing investiga tion and experimentation.
Concluding Remarks
We have studied several learning models from game the ory, and their extension to coordination problems with un observable actions. As we have seen, a number of differ ent problem features, such asymmetries in utility and failure probabilities can have surprising effects of convergence to a coordinated equilibrium. We have also proposed the use of conventions as a means to restrict attention to particular equilibria, in some cases allowing eventual rel ief from hav ing to "think about" what action to perform.
The experimental results are not conclusive; rather they are merely suggestive of interesting models for coordina tion learning, models that require further exploration. How ever, some of these directions appear promising. In ad dition, the interaction of these methods in true sequential decision problems consisting of a wide variety of related state games is of considerable interest [2] . In this setting, we are ultimately interested in the generalization of learned conventions across similar state games, exploiting struc tured (Bayes net) representations of games and utility fu nc tions, as in [3] . Finally, generalizations of this model, espe cially those where only partial common knowledge of the game structure is assumed, will be required to make the ef fort more robust and realistic. This will require the use of ideas from reinforcement learning and learning models of dynamical systems.
